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Hark: Hark: Closing Arguments

Closing Arguments: Enforcing Fairness
in the Presentation of Damages
Tune v. Synergy Gas Co.'
I.

TTRODUCTION

The permissible scope of closing arguments before a jury is broad.' One
limit, however, arises in plaintiff's final closing argument
Of those
jurisdictions that allow plaintiffs to split their argument, most either require
that plaintiff's final closing argument cover only those matters raised by
defendant in closing argument' or require that anything sufficiently raised by
plaintiff's initial closing argument or defendant's closing argument is
appropriate.'

1. 883 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. 1994).
2. Zoemer v. Iwan, 619 N.E.2d 892, 901 (111. App. Ct. 1993); Lewis v. BucyrusErie, Inc., 622 S.W.2d 920, 925 (Mo. 1981); Kubiszak v. Rinis Supermarket, 603
N.E.2d 308, 314 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991). See also WJaLRD R. LORRY, A CIVIL
ACTION: TIE TRIAL 126 (1959); JACOB A. STEIN, CLOSING ARGUMENTS: T ART
AND THE LAW § 12, at 125 (1994).
While the discretion is broad, there are limits upon the scope of argument.
JAMES R. DEvIm, MISSOURI CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 32-21 (1986)
(including as improperly arousing racial prejudice and resentment, derogatory
comments about attorneys, appeals to passion, andwealth of party); STEIN, supra § 12;
Russell, Inc. v. Trento, 445 So. 2d 390, 392 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that
arguments about quantifying a monetary value for a human life are inappropriate).
3. Closing arguments are typically structured so that the party with the burden of
proof argues first. DEvNE, supra note 2, § 32-21; STEIN, supra note 2, § 5. The
party with the burden of proof may be allowed to split the allotted time in order to
argue first and last. Id. Typically, the party with the burden of proof is the plaintiff.
Thus, throughout the text of this note, the party with the burden of proof will be
referred to generically as the plaintiff.
Additionally, there is no uniform nomenclature to distinguish between plaintiff s
two closing arguments. For consistency, this note has incorporated the terminology
employed by the majority in Tune which refers to the plaintiff s first argument as the
plaintiff's initial closing argument and the plaintiff's reply after the defendant's closing

argument as the plaintiff's final closing argument. Tune, 883 S.W.2d at 17 n.1.
4. STEIN, supra note 2, § 5; LESLIE H. VOGEL, FINAL ARGUMENT 4-5 (1954).
5. J. ALExANDER TANFORD, TBE TRIAL PROCEss: LAW, TACTICS AND ETmcs
142 (1983). This rule, the expanded rebuttal rule, is utilized in Missouri. Tune, 883
S.W.2d at 17. But cf Friedman v. United Rys. Co., 238 S.W. 1074 (Mo. 1922)
(holding that the purpose of the final closing argument is rebuttal and if the defendant

waives argument the plaintiff is not entitled to a final closing argument).
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Offering the party with the burden of proof an opportunity to respond to
any new arguments raised by the opposing party arose from notions of
fairness.6 In Tune v. Synergy Gas Co., the Missouri Supreme Court
reaffirmed the purpose of the plaintiff's final closing argument.' The court
held that it was an abuse of discretion to allow a plaintiff to withhold a
request for a specific amount for total damages until the plaintiff's final
closing argument, when the issue had not been addressed by the initial closing
argument or the defendant's argument.9 This Note reviews the Tune decision,
and discusses the logic and fairness inherent in the court's decision.
HI. FACTS AND HOLDING
Ronald Tune brought an action against Synergy Gas Company
(hereinafter Synergy) for failure to warn.' 0 Mr. Tune had a propane tank
filled at the 71 Truck Stop, which was owned by Synergy." Although a
portable propane cylinder tank like the one used by the plaintiff should only
be filled to eighty percent capacity, the attendant at the truckstop filled the
Mr. Tune used the tank later
tank to approximately one hundred percent
in the day." The propane, which had leaked out due to the overfilling and
Mr. Tune suffered
the heat of the day, ignited around Mr. Tune."
permanent injuries from the severe bums which covered over forty percent of

his body.'
In the plaintiff's initial closing argument, counsel stated that the out-ofpocket expenses totalled $54,419.28.16 Additionally, counsel emphasized that
the jury would have to award a sum for pain and suffering, future medical
expenses, and future lost earnings.' The defense counsel's only mention of
damages in closing argument was "Mr. Tune received bad injuries' and that

6. FRANcIs X. BuscH, LAw AND TACTICS INJuRy TRIAs §§ 514-15 (1949);
STEIN, supranote 2, §§ 5, 23.
7. 883 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. 1994).

8. Id. at 22.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 10. Although the initial pleadings enumerated four separate claims,
only the failure to warn claim was pursued to fruition. Id. at 13.
11. Id. at 12.
12. Id. at 12-13.
13. Id. at 12.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 13.
16. Id. at 16.
17. Id. at 23.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/8
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he [defendant's counsel] did 'not want to downplay the injuries. ''1 s The
plaintiff, in final closing argument, specifically requested the jury to award
$3,368,825.29 in damages."
The defense objected claiming that total
damages were not sufficiently raised in the plaintiff's initial closing argument
or in the defendant's closing argument.2" The plaintiff maintained that
damages were specifically raised by giving a specific sum for out of pocket
expenses.2 The trial court overruled the objection.22 The jury returned a
verdict of $2,850,000 for the plaintiff.' The Missouri Court of Appeals,
Southern District, affirmed.24
Upon transfer, a five-two majority' of the Missouri Supreme Court
reversed and remanded on the damages issue.26 It ruled that allowing a
plaintiff to request a specific total damage amount for the first time in the
plaintiff's final closing argument is an abuse of discretion and subject to a
rebuttable presumption of prejudice.27 If the plaintiff cannot overcome the
presumption of prejudice, then it is reversible error.2"
Judge Holstein, in dissent, argued that no error was shown because there
was no evidence that the trial court abused its discretion or that the error was
prejudicial.29
The dissent suggested three factors that could aid a
determination of whether an abuse of discretion occurred. He advocated an
inquiry into whether there was (1) surprise by the defendant, (2) waiver by the
defendant, and (3) an excessively large verdict.3"

18. Id. at 16.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 16-17.
21. Id. at 17.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 22.
24. Tune v. Synergy, No. 18273, 1993 WL 309055 (Mo. Ct. App. Aug. 17,
1993).
25. The majority opinion, written by Judge Thomas, was joined by Chief Justice
Covington and Judges Price, Limbaugh and Robertson. The dissent, written by Judge

Holstein, was joined by Judge Benton. Tune, 883 S.W.2d at 22-23.
26. Id. at 22.
27. Id. at 20.
28. Id. at 22.
29. Id. at 23 (Holstein, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 26-27 (Holstein, J., dissenting).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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LEGAL BACKGROUND

The rule precluding a plaintiff from raising new matters in final closing
argument first arose in the Florida case of Seaboard Air Line Railway v.
Rentz." In Seaboard, the plaintiff failed to present any argument in his
initial closing argument except a general assertion that the defendant was
liable. 2 After the trial court overruled the defendant's objection that the
plaintiff's argument was insufficient, the defendant presented his closing
argument.33 The plaintiff then presented a detailed final closing argument.3
The defendant renewed his objection, requesting a chance to respond to the
plaintiff's contentions, but was again overruled. 5
Although holding that the record did not show prejudice to the defendant,
the Florida Supreme Court expressed its disapproval of a plaintiff's
"sandbagging."36 The court noted that a rule essentially allowing a plaintiff
to make a defendant argue first, without a chance to reply, was unfair. 7
Although Missouri followed the logic inherent in Seaboard Air Line
Railway, it was not until Votrain v. Illinois Terminal R. Co." that the
Missouri Supreme Court addressed the issue in the context of specifically
mentioning a damages sum in final closing argument. In Votrain, the plaintiff
discussed damages generally in his initial closing argument and concluded by
stating "in my [final] closing argument I would like to offer whatever
assistance I can in connection to you [regarding computing damages]. 3 9 In
his closing argument, the defendant discussed liability and the extent of Mr.
Votrain's injury.4" The plaintiff in the final closing argument suggested that
the jury award his client $85,000.1 The trial court sustained the defendant's
objection to raising the sum but denied a motion for a mistrial. 2 Later in
the argument, the plaintiff again mentioned the sum of $85,000.Y The court

31. 54 So. 20, 23 (Fla. 1910); ProprietyandEffect ofPermittingCounselHaving
Burden of Issues in Civil Case to Argue New Matter or Points in His Closing
Summation, 93 A.L.R.2d 273 (1963) [hereinafter Propriety].
32. SeaboardAir Line Ry., 54 So. at 23.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 268 S.W.2d. 838 (Mo. 1954).
39. Id. at 843.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 844.
42. Id.
43. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/8
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again had the reference stricken from the record and gave a curative
instruction to the jury, but denied a motion for mistrial.44 The defendant
subsequently appealed the denial of a motion for mistrial.45
On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the motion
for mistrial.46 It explained that the purpose of allowing plaintiffs to split
their arguments is to provide them with an opportunity to reply to points
raised by the defense. 47 The court further noted that the final closing
argument, "by better procedure and practice, should be in the form of
rebuttal." 48 Therefore, the court held that raising a specific amount of
damages, despite having raised damages generally, was error if not specifically
raised in the initial argument.49 The court affirmed the trial court, however,
finding the trial court's remedy of the error did not amount to abuse of
discretion."S
In Shaw v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n, the Missouri Supreme Court
again considered the proper procedure for raising damages in final closing
arguments. The plaintiff, in his initial closing argument, did not mention
damages 2 except to state he "had some other points" to develop in his final
argument.53 The defense interjected that he wanted the plaintiff put on
notice that an objection would be raised if the plaintiff did not mention
damages until the final closing argument.54 The Court refused to caution the
plaintiff.55 The defendant did not mention damages in his closing, but the
plaintiff in his final closing argument asked the jury for $25,000.6
The court ruled that it was "unfair and improper" for the plaintiff in his
final closing argument to raise damages for the first time after being put on
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

48. Id. For a discussion of the extent of the rebuttal rule in Missouri, see Tune,

883 S.W.2d at 18 nn.3-4.
49. SeaboardAirLine Ry., 54 So. at 23.
50. Id. at 844. The rule giving trial courts broad discretion is common. See, e.g.,
Williston v. Ard, 611 So. 2d 274, 280 (Ala. 1992); Taluzek v. Illinois Central Gulf

App. Ct. 1993); Guidry v. Boston Old Colony Ins.
R.R., 626 N.E.2d 1367, 1378 (Ill.
Co., 540 So. 2d 543, 546 (La. Ct. App. 1989); Worthington City Schs. v. ABCO
Insulation, 616 N.E.2d 550, 557 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
51. 344 S.W.2d. 32 (Mo. 1961).
52. The court regarded mentions by plaintiff of being hit or getting hurt as purely
incidental and not sufficient to raise damages. Id. at 36.

53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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notice by the defendant." The court noted that a contrary decision would
be antithetical to the purpose of allowing the party with the burden of proof
to split the argument." However, the court affirmed the decision because the
defendant did not renew his motion in the final closing argument."'
Following Shaw, Missouri courts avoided defining what constituted
proper argument in the plaintiff's initial closing argument by focusing upon
waiver by the defense.' The general rule to emerge from this line of cases
was that if a defendant raised an issue generally, the plaintiff was allowed to
address the issue in his final closing argument."'
Finally, in Hart v. Forbes6" the Western District Court of Appeals

addressed what constituted proper damages argument in the initial closing
argument. In Hart,the trial court had ruled that where a plaintiff had raised
a specific sum in initial closing argument, but not the total amount, and the
defendant had not waived the damages issue, 3 the trial court's disallowance
of the argument as improper was not an abuse of discretion."

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 37.
60. Sullivan v. Hanley, 347 S.W.2d 710, 716 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961); Barrett v.
Morris, 495 S.W.2d 100, 105 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Weinbauer v. Berberich, 610
S.W.2d 674, 678 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
61. Sullivan, 347 S.W.2d at 714-16 (noting that comment in the defendant's
summation that the plaintiff had only been seen 13 times by doctor allowed the
plaintiff to address damages in the final closing argument); Barrett, 495 S.W.2d at
105; Weinbauer, 610 S.W.2d at 678.
62. 633 S.W.2d 90 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)
63. Id. at 96. The court noted that the defendant had not mentioned damages by
stating:
Well, I want to talk to you just a minute about damages in this case. I
don't think they will be necessary for you to get to the issue of
damages... [if] nine or more of you agree that it was not Cathy Forbes'
fault... then there's no reason to go any further.
Id. at 94.
64. Id. at 96. For a similar result see Heddendorfv. Joyce, 178 So. 2d 126, 128
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) which characterized plaintiff's mention of a specific amount
for out-of-pocket expenses, while withholding the total specific sum for the final
closing argument, as a "'bikini'-of the damages he was asking the jury to return."

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/8
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IV.

INSTANT DECISION

A. Majority Opinion
In Tune,65 the Missouri Supreme Court held that allowing a plaintiff to
raise a specific amount for total damages in the final closing argument, when
not raised in the initial closing argument or in the defendant's closing
argument, is error.66 The trial court's allowance of the argument after the
defendant's proper objection was held to constitute an abuse of discretion by
the trial court.' After a general review of the expanded rebuttal rule in
Missouri,' the court noted that proper argument is determined by:
whether the argument plaintiff's counsel made in the final portion of his
closing argument was closely enough related to the damage argument made
in the initial
portion of his closing argument that it constituted proper
69
argument.

The court further discussed the scope of discretion permitted by the trial
judge in determining what comprises proper argument.1 0
While
acknowledging that the trial court ordinarily has broad discretion in regulating
the scope of closing argument, the court found this discretion limited when
dealing with damages. 7 Particularly, the court traced the rule to language
in Goldstein v. Fendelman.72 Goldstein stated "we consider it unfair and
improper to permit plaintiff's counsel to do it [ask for a specific amount of
'
damages] for the first time in his closing argument."73
The court concluded
that fundamental fairness and ease of application supported the rule.74
Turning to the issue of prejudice, the court analyzed two lines of cases
addressing when error is prejudicial. 5 One line of cases uses excessiveness

of the verdict as the test of prejudice.16 The second line, embodied in Lester

65. 883 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. 1994).

66. Id. at 20.
67. Id.
68. See supra note 5.

69. Tune, 883 S.W.2d at 18.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 19.
336 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Mo. 1960).
Tune, 883 S.W.2d at 19 (citing Goldstein) (brackets added by court).
Id.

75. Id. at 20.

76. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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v. Sayles," presumed prejudice by the party who committed error concerning
damages."
The court next examined the effect of the respective standards under each
case. 9 The effect of an excessive verdict standard was found to presume
that no prejudice results from error, while the rule of Lester presumes all error
had a dilatory effect." The court stated that improperly arguing damages in
closing argument was most likely to have a prejudicial effect.81
Consequently, the court reasoned that the error should be presumed
prejudicialF and the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial on
damages.'
B. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Holstein began the dissent by discussing the trial court's broad
discretion in adjudicating the proper scope of closing arguments." The
dissent opined that Shaw,'5 relied upon by the majority for the proposition
that the trial court is limited in deciding the proper scope in arguing damages,
could be read to hold that only general and special damages must be raised in
the initial argument, not that all special damages must be addressed in order
to later raise a total damages calculation.86 Applying that reading to the
instant case led to the conclusion that the argument was proper.8
The dissent suggested that the determination of whether the court abused
its discretion in allowing an argument should be a case by case
determination." The dissent stated that a nonexhaustive list of factors to
77. 850 S.W.2d 858 (Mo. 1993).
78. Tune, 883 S.W.2d at 21.
79. Id.
80. Id. Accord Bell v. Blackwell, 283 S.W.2d 765, 766 (I'ex. Ct. App. 1926).
81. Tune, 883 S.W.2d at 21. This assumption was also noted to be consistent
with the rules of evidence, which typically require the party who committed the error
to show that the error did not have a prejudicial effect. Id. at 22.
82. Not all presentation of new matters will constitute prejudice. For example,
it is in the trial court's discretion to allow argument to new matters where the issue
was inadvertently omitted by the plaintiff. Shaw v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 344 S.W.2d
32, 36-37 (Mo. 1961); Brown v. Rogers, 313 A.2d 547, 553 (Md. Ct. App. 1974);
Jordan v. Taylor, 161 S.E.2d 790, 795-96 (Va. 1968). See also Propriety,supranote
31, at 274.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Tune, 883 S.W.2d at 22.
Id. at 23 (Holstein, J., dissenting).

See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
Tune, 883 S.W.2d at 24 (Holstein, J., dissenting).
Id.

88. Id. at 26 (Holstein, J., dissenting).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/8
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consider in determining whether an abuse occurred would include whether
"based upon the entire record . . . the plaintiff may be said to have
sandbagged," waiver by defendant s9 and whether improper argument "had the
effect of producing an excessively large verdict.190
The dissent further criticized the majority's decision to presume prejudice
when dealing with an improper damages argument in summation. 91 The
dissent claimed that the decision overruled a long line of cases establishing
excessiveness of verdict as the standard. 92 The dissent further stated that
damages should not be presumed because MAI 2.01 adequately informs the
jury that closing "argument is baloney."'
Finally, the dissent criticized the rule relied upon by the majority as being
technical and rigid. 94 The dissent noted that although useful in the abstract,
rigid rules often prove inequitable in administration. Therefore, the reviewing
court should make a case by case determination.95
V. COMNMNT
Given the origins of the procedure for splitting closing arguments in
notions of faimess, 9' a rule contrary to the court's decision in Tune would
have led to a perversion of the expanded rebuttal rules that have developed in
MissouriY By allowing the plaintiff both the psychological advantage of
going first and last,93 and the opportunity to interject new matters in the final
closing argument, Missouri courts would deprive the defendant of the

89. The dissent would include as a waiver the failure of a defendant to give full
demand and notice or the failure to seek a less drastic relief. Id. at 27 (Holstein, J.,
dissenting).
90. Id. at 26 (Holstein, 3., dissenting).

91. Id.
92. Id. at 27 (Holstein, J., dissenting). In particular, the dissent felt that Lester
only stood for the management of jury deliberations and not for arguments. Id. at 29
(Holstein, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 28 (Holstein, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 29 (Holstein, J., dissenting).
95. Id.
96. See supranote 6 and accompanying text.
97. For example, those jurisdictions which have maintained a strict rebuttal rule
would not allow a plaintiff to have a final closing argument in those cases where the
defendant waives his closing argument. VOGEL, supranote 4, at 13. While Missouri

has expanded the scope of the argument by adopting the expanded rule, allowing any
new argument would strip any remaining vestiges of the traditional rule. See supra
notes 4-5 and accompanying text.

98. BuscH, supranote 6, § 495; THOMAs A. MAUET, FUNDAvmNTALS OF TRiAL
supra note 4, at 1.

TECHNIQUES 296 (3d ed. 1992); VOGEL,
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fundamental fairness which the expanded rebuttal rule envisioned.99 The
defendant would be deprived of a fair opportunity to respond.'
Clearly, reliance upon a blanket rule requiring surprise would shift the
balance originally established by the rules, giving an advantage to the plaintiff
which the courts believed imprudent when reversed."0 The rationale for
prohibiting new matters derives naturally from the justification for splitting the
argument."° Neither party should be put in the position of having to attack
points and arguments which are not yet made."°
While the foregoing analysis may explain the rationale behind prohibiting
new matters to be raised in final closing argument, initially it appears
insufficient to explain why total damages must be raised with specificity in
initial closing arguments. T' The criticism would be appropriate if the issue
is critiqued in relative terms of generality and specificity. While generality
and specificity analysis would be appropriate for most issues discussed under
the new matter rules, when analyzing damages arguments, blind adherence to
this rule would cause one to miss the trees for the clich6. When analyzed in
terms of generality, the inquiry would be: "Was the argument raised generally
in the initial argument?" If the answer is affirmative, then the plaintiff would
be justified in discussing the issue with greater specificity in the final closing

99. STEIN, supra note 2, §§ 5, 23.

100. Admittedly, the definition of fair is a nebulous concept. Some would
respond, as did the dissent, that a fair rebuttal is possible in closing arguments if there
is no showing of surprise based upon the entire record. Tune, 883 S.W.2d at 26
(Holstein, J., dissenting). That argument mistakes the point of reference. Notice is not

determined based upon evidence admitted in trial but in the initial argument. The
dissent's reasoning would otherwise lead to the conclusion that there is no need to split
the argument portion at all since the scope of closing arguments is limited to the facts

and inferences fairly derived from the evidence presented. DEVINE, supra note 2,
§ 32-21; LORRY, supranote2, at 126. Thus a plaintiff would have no legitimate right
to split the argument.
101. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
102. See Shaw v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 334 S.W.2d 32, 36 (Mo. 1961).
103. Id.
104. For example, the dissent in Tune opined:
Shaw stands for the proposition that in the second portion of closing
argument, a plaintiff can argue anything that plaintiff argued in the initial
part of closing argument and may rebut anything that the defendant argued
in defendant's portion of the closing argument. Applying the principle
here, plaintiff argued both special and general damages during the initial
argument, specifically mentioning plaintiff's claim for pain and suffering
....
Thus the Shaw rule was not violated.
Tune, 883 S.W.2d at 24 (Holstein, J. dissenting).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/8
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argument." 5 Such an understanding of the rule could easily result from
broad language which has been loosely employed by the court. °6 However,
when the test is couched in fairness the inquiry becomes: "Has the subject
been raised specifically enough to allow a response?" This fairness test would
lead to a more consistent result. 107
In many instances, the inquiry into the appropriateness of the argument
using either test would yield the correct result. If a plaintiff raises the extent
of damages generally,108 for instance, the proof that the defendant would
wish to emphasize will change little from if a detailed discussion of damages
was initially made by the plaintiff."9 The adverse party will tend to remind
the jury of the same evidence which impeaches the nature or extent of the
plaintiff's damages.
However, the flaw of generality and specificity analysis is apparent when
considering damages. If the inquiry is, "Was the issue raised generally in the
initial argument?," the answer is still affirmative.1 0 However, if the inquiry
is, "Has the subject been raised specifically enough in the initial closing

105. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Midwest Library Serv., Inc. v. Structural Sys., Inc., 566 S.W.2d
249, 251 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) ("A plaintiff hormally may not, in the second part of
his closing argument, introduce an issue which he has not addressed in the opening
part.").
107. Heddendorf v. Joyce, 178 So. 2d 126, 129 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965) ("Our
concern here is founded upon the nature, function and purpose of closing argument.
A trial is not a game to see by what legal stratagem one may procure an advantage
over the other.").
While courts have made such altruistic declarations, absent judicial enforcement,
attorneys do make strategic decisions based uponhow far they perceive the rules may

be bent. See BuscH, supra note 6, § 514.
108. See MAUET, supranote 98, at 293 (noting that a common strategy is to raise
a specific sum for damages in the initial closing argument and then to discuss the
details of arriving at that sum in the final closing argument).

109. For example, in the instance of Mr. Tune, if the plaintiff only made
tangential comment upon the bums or mental suffering, the defense is not likely to

raise the subject of the amount of pain that was suffered. Likewise, if this was a case
which involved a broken leg and subsequent partial loss of function in the leg, the
defense is likely to discuss the relative merits of the degree of damage regardless of

the specificity withwhich the disability is addressed by plaintiffs in their initial closing
argument. The damages context differs in this regard because the amount of damages
requested and the computation are often not revealed until the closing argument.

Comments such as, "I would not take three million dollars to go through this again"
would not be sufficient to allow defendant a fair chance to anticipate and reply.

110. Tune, 883 S.W.2d at 23 (Holstein, J., dissenting).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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argument to allow a response?," the answer is negative."' The second result
is the correct result because the defendant is put in the virtually impossible
position 2of arguing against a specific amount of damages that has never been
1
raised.
Since allowing a specific total sum of damages to be raised for the first
time in the final closing argument should always constitute error, a bright line
rule making this an abuse of discretion makes imminent sense." When
viewed with the fundamental fairness function of closing arguments in mind,
there can be only one result absent an opportunity for the defendant to
reply." 4 Therefore, an abuse of discretion analysis is futile because
determining whether the issue is raised does not require the broad discretion
Furthermore, the closing argument
granted the court in other areas.'
performs a special function in the trial. Its function and importance stem from
the fact that this is the one time that all the evidence is integrated and
presented to the jury for consideration in toto." 6 Thus, the need for
persuasiveness exhibited by the argument demands strict enforcement.

111. See supra note 73 and accompnaying text; Heddendorf,178 So. 2d at 130
("To permit the plaintiff for the first time to trap the defendant by briefly mentioning

what he plans to argue and then bear down and explore a new method for the
edification of the jury in computing damages at a point when the defendant has no
opportunity to rebut is not only unfair to the defendant but is prejudicial."); LAWRENCE
J. SMITH ART OF ADVOCACY: SUMMATION 2-7 (1978). See Cortez v. Macias, 110

Cal. App. 3d 640,658 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); Indianapolis R.R.v. Boyd, 53 N.E.2d 762
(Ind. 1944).
112. See Tune, 883 S.W.2d at 20. See also JOHN S. ALLEE, PRODUCT LIABILrrY
§ 15.04[4][a] (1991) (stating that even if a plaintiff raises a specific sum for damages
in the closing argument, the defense should not mention a specific sum because of the
danger the jury will split the difference or interpret raising the sum as a tacit admission
of liability); BUsCH, supra note 6, § 511 (warning that a defendant's mention of
damages runs the risk of being interpreted as a tacit admission).
113. Heddendorf,178 So.2d at 130. Failure to utilize a bright line rule leads to
strategic sandbagging in the initial closing argument based upon the attorney's
perception of the likelihood that the trial judge will enforce the rules. One
commentator suggested such a strategic assessment cautioning that "[k]nowing how
strictly the court will sustain scope objections to far-ranging rebuttal arguments is of
course critical here." MAUET, supra note 98, at 278.
114. See supra notes 74, 110 and accompanying text.
115. The trial court would, however, have discretion in the appropriate remedy.
See Votrain v. Illinois Terminal R. Co., 268 S.W.2d 838, 844 (Mo. 1954). See also
supranote 71 and accompanying text.
116. BUSCH, supra note 6, § 493 (1949) (noting that the "value of [closing]
argument as an instrument of persuasion can not be overestimated").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/8
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In conclusion, the rule established in Tune is administrable and
enforceable. Furthermore, with this decision, the Missouri Supreme Court
reaffirmed the notion of fairness upon which closing arguments rest.
JOHN M. HARK
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